

Critique for Action: Outline of a Craft Turn in Security Practices

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Abstract

Building on the seminal works of Aristotle highlighting three virtues of thought for a well-functioning society: episteme (scientific), techne (craft) and phronesis (practical judgment), this article argues that CSS would benefit from leveraging critique with a scientific attitude towards a craft attitude if it hopes to better intervene in security realities in the future. The intent of this article is therefore to shed light on an alternative pathway to dominant critical practices in CSS. This proposition is one possibility among many to emancipate CSS from a deadlock resulting from a tension between those seeking to show how security realities could be otherwise and those seeking to make this otherwise, a reality mostly in the form of denunciatory critique in sophisticated textual production. To show the potential of a craft inclined CSS, this article presents four craft principles building on Aristotle and Charles Peirce: producing knowledge with a conscious intent, abductively, radically particular and self-corrective, on the one hand. On the other hand, this article shows how some security practitioners expressed these craft principles to leverage the same underlying philosophy as CSS in order to be more relevant in intervening in security realities. The Israel Defense Forces-led disengagement of Gaza in 2005 is used as an example. These findings are based on over 80 interviews with critical security practitioners and participant observation in Israel Defense Forces, the US Army & Special Forces and Canadian Armed Forces between in 2015 and 2018.

Introduction

I am well aware that this will not be easy, but at the end of the day, there has to be an attempt to impact upon practice; that remains the ultimate test of the usefulness of the critical approach.

Richard Wyn Jones (2012: 100)

During two weeks in June 2017, a syndicate of 10 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) majors radically changed their way of thinking about West Africa at Canadian Forces College (CFC).¹ They did so by building on poststructuralism, one of the school of thoughts underlying Critical Security Studies (CSS).² Ben Zweibelson (2017), the syndicate's facilitator and the Design programme director at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) of US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), set the conditions for this to occur. While briefing a retired general, Zweibelson's students offered an understanding of West Africa and three approaches that were unthinkable for them before the exercise. Instead of taking for granted 'problems to solve' in West Africa, the students redirected problematization inward, towards themselves and their organizations. For instance, students disrupted their initial Orientalist perspective and traded it for an empathetic and symmetric understanding of everyday west Africans. From this understanding, they offered three approaches: seeing Islam as part of the solution instead of a problem, facilitating technology transfers to better adapt agriculture to climate change, and limiting demand for narcotics instead of directly using physical violence against smugglers.

Yet, Zweibelson and his team did not leverage poststructuralism in the same way as CSS scholars would have if tasked with the same challenge. For Zweibelson and his team leveraged poststructuralism from a design thinking perspective. Design thinking is an umbrella term for methodologies enabling to create something that does not yet exist aiming at changing the status quo into a preferred one (Nelson & Stolterman, 2012; Simon, 1996: 111).³ Instead of faithfully turning theory into practice grounded into a scientific attitude, design thinking encourages individuals to ground knowledge into a craft attitude. In his approaches to knowledge production (also known as *virtues of thought*), Aristotle (2014) associates craft (also known as *techne*) to the

¹ One year later, Zweibelson led a team again. They tackled the challenge of redesigning NATO's strategic narrative towards the Post-Soviet European Space with 2030 as a time horizon. Zweibelson's team mostly directed the inquiry inward, disrupting current conventions over force development anchored in an analog reality (1.0) hindering NATO's relevance towards Russia in comparison to fully transitioning to the digital reality (2.0).

² Of all school of thoughts, Ben Zweibelson found in poststructuralism the greatest promises to disrupt assumptions of militaries building on seminal authors such as Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière, Paul Ricoeur, and their derivatives in architecture, organization studies, and system thinking to name a few. Both poststructuralism and these authors are also seminal to the underlying philosophies of CSS.

³ Design thinking could be more precisely located at the intersection between a craft and practical attitude. However, armed forces leverage design thinking mostly in a craft attitude and minimally in a practical attitude in the sense of value judgement or prudence.

productive logic of any individual *making* something to reach a conscious goal such as artists or craftsmen. In this article, the value is in developing new concept enabling to shape security realities into preferred ones. Aristotle contrasts this attitude to the traditional scientific attitude — called *episteme* — grounded on discovering new principles disinterested from a specific context and a practical attitude — called *phronesis* — grounded on the wisdom and judgment required to act properly. While a scientific attitude is founded on analytical based rationality, the craft attitude is founded on a pragmatic rationality and a practical attitude, on a value-based rationality (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 56).

Instead of prioritizing one virtue over the other, Aristotle stresses that 'every well-functioning society was dependent on the effective functioning of all three intellectual virtues — episteme, techne, and phronesis — in, respectively, science, art/ crafts, and ethics' according to Bent Flyvbjerg (2001: 56). After armed forces prioritized episteme over techne and phronesis in the form of a scientific way of warfare from the 17th century onwards, the increasing shift towards design thinking in armed forces signals a rebalancing mostly towards a craft attitude and minimally towards a practical attitude since 2005 onwards around the world (Bousquet, 2009).⁴ In echo to Aristotle's ideal, the aim of this craft turn is to transform planning officers into professionals able to leverage 'techne with a head on it' (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 168).

Building both on the seminal works of Aristotle and on how specific individuals use critique in armed forces in recent years, I argue that CSS would also benefit from rebalancing knowledge production from a scientific attitude towards a craft attitude if it hopes to better intervene in security realities in the future. The intent of this article is therefore to shed light on an alternative pathway to dominant critical practices in CSS in the form of an outline to be further developed in forthcoming research. This proposition is one possibility among many to emancipate CSS from a deadlock resulting from a tension between those seeking to show how security realities could be otherwise and those seeking to make this otherwise, a reality. As Nik Hynek and David Chandler (2013) observed, the voice of the former gradually supplanted the latter especially in the last two decades. As a result, CSS tended to reward denunciatory critique

⁴ Operational art remains a previous attempt to rebalance these virtues in the United States in the 1980s and originally, after the October revolution in the Soviet Union.

in sophisticated textual products in comparison to rewarding a portfolio of cases showing attempts at changing security realities. However, recent global phenomena such as the rise of the precariat, the rise of mass migration, or the rise of the far right are more and more revealing the limits of denunciatory critique. And, a new generation of scholars is compelling CSS to explore alternative pathways to satisfy its original normative commitment to intervene in security realities (Lisle, 2016: 419). Michael C. Williams and Keith Krause (1997), the very same pioneers who developed CSS in theoretical opposition to neorealism and strategic studies, are already showing the promises of this direction.⁵ This special issue is a testimony of the importance of this debate for CSS and Critical International Relations, more broadly.

CSS might learn from security practitioners by turning them from an object of critique to agents fully capable of doing and mediating critique to intervene in security realities.⁶ In other words, one possible pathway may be found in turning upside down CSS's relationship to security practitioners from asymmetry to symmetry with regard to their critical capacities. Indeed, this move would not mean that CSS has to agree with the vocation of security practitioners, but simply recognize that both communities share the will to make sense of, and make a difference in, security phenomena by leveraging critique. While CSS might want to build on Sociology (Boltanski, 2009) or Ethnography (Dufort, 2014) to learn from the lay critique practiced by security practitioners, I seek to highlight what CSS might learn from some security practitioners leveraging the same seminal literature, especially poststructuralism.⁷

⁵ Krause, seeks to reconsider, if not reconcile Robert Cox's (1981) opposites between problem-solving and critical theory for developing better emancipatory strategies to inform peace or security building practices. The latter, Williams (2017; 2012), seeks to reconsider the opposition between critical IR and realism in order to better engage common concerns of contemporary security. These authors support, at least implicitly, a craft attitude over a scientific attitude to revive CSS.

⁶ This observation as well as the argument are based on more than 80 interviews on the record with commanders, planners, developers and instructors as well as hundred hours of conversation with student officers and participant observation in Israel Defence Forces, the US Army & Special Forces and Canadian Armed Forces between 2015 and 2018. Philippe Dufort (2014) also came to the same conclusion in conducting ethnographic research about the indigenous reflexive capacities of some officers in Colombian Armed Forces.

⁷ Some military designers rely on poststructuralism rooted in Kant, that is, aiming at showing that reality could be otherwise. They rely on the same canons inspiring some CSS scholars such as Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière, Paul Ricoeur, Paul Virilio and their derivatives in architecture, organization studies, and system thinking to name a few. As this article argues, security practitioners do not rely on these authors in a scientific attitude, but in a craft attitude. They also use several other disciplines unrelated to poststructuralism.

To do so, I will develop what a craft attitude may entail for CSS in two complementary ways. I first excavate the theoretical roots of craft from Aristotle to Charles Pierce and beyond in the form of four principles: (1) embracing abduction above induction and deduction, (2) self-correction towards excellence, (3) conscious intent throughout the process and (4) particularism. I will then expose how some security practitioners building on design thinking express these principles while thinking, planning and conducting operations with the example of the Israeli-led disengagement of Gaza by Brigadier General (BGen.) Gershon Hacoheh in 2005. Communities of security practitioners as well as the international community represented by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan praised the conduct of the operation, to name a few.

Theorizing, Doing, & Making

“Every craft is concerned with coming to be, that is, with crafting things and getting a theoretical grasp on how something may come to be that admits of being and of not being and whose starting point is in the producer and not in the product.”
(Aristotle & Reeve, 2014: 101)

Future archaeologists of CSS will likely prove better at finding masterpieces inside bibliographies rather than in portfolios. As Flyvbjerg (2001: 167) observed for social sciences as a whole and as hinted above, CSS’ ambitions remain mostly in episteme. CSS knowledge production, at least in recent years, has sought to substitute theories and principles from seminal texts for practice and craft, thus effectively attempting to turn theory into practice akin to most sciences. In most cases, the result remains denunciatory critique available in sophisticated textual production validated and self-sustained by the CSS community. This is not surprising. As Richard Wyn Jones (1995: 314) observed, the social scientific academic institution embedding CSS provides more incentives for scholars to become masters in crafting scholarly texts than masters in re-crafting security realities.

Nonetheless, crafting texts for the purpose of problematizing new objects and subjects of security is not without commonalities with re-crafting security realities. CSS’ masterpieces such as Ken Booth’s (1991) ‘Security and Emancipation’ as well as security practitioners’ masterpieces such as the IDF’s Disengagement of Gaza in 2005 — from their respective perspective — express similar principles. Indeed, crafting a textual masterpiece, as well as a security operation, are far too complex to be solely reduced to a list of principles to be

reproduced. This would also be in contradiction with a craft attitude. Yet, bringing to consciousness some principles found across instances of craft might open new possibilities for CSS knowledge production in the 21st century if the CSS community would choose to redirect the agenda towards changing security realities.

At least four principles reflect the nature of crafting: 1. Conscious intent that may lead to propositions, moves or actions enacted through some form of material representation (a text, a drawing or a model for instance), 2. prioritizing retroduction (most commonly known as abduction), that is, inference to the best explanation over induction and deduction to generate new knowledge, 3. Radical particularism over universalism and 4. Self and peer-correction towards excellence also known as feedback loop or retroaction. Each of these principles could already be found in the philosophy of Aristotle to distinguish *techne* from *episteme* and *phronesis*, without excluding one from the other. Philosophers writing much later, especially in the early American pragmatic tradition, developed most of these principles further.

Conscious Intent

Despite prizing scientific knowledge for solely contemplative purposes, Aristotle was well aware that scientific knowledge alone would fail to ground the necessity of action sustaining the city. As Aristotle (2014: 99) remarked, ‘thought by itself, however, moves nothing. But the one that is for the sale of something and practice does.’ *Techne* and *Phronesis* are better suited for action than *Episteme*. One of the key reasons is that crafting is driven by a conscious intent and has a purpose from beginning to end. In contrast, *Episteme* begins with principles and end with principles without a predetermined conscious goal. From an Aristotelian perspective, the sole intent behind producing scientific knowledge is contemplation or knowledge for knowledge’s sake. Max Weber (2004), much later, solidified this perspective, arguing that the integrity of theory could only be secured with a distance from a practical purpose. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s (1973) post-WWII philosophy, a component of CSS’ underlying philosophy, contributed in consolidating this understanding of knowledge production in CSS. For them, conscious intent would lead, one way or another, to reification and instrumentalization, eventually turning means into ends in themselves (Levine, 2012; Wyn Jones, 1999).

These concerns, however, are based on a scientific understanding of knowledge production assuming that theory informs practice in a linear relationship. Craft bypasses this concern as it neither begins nor ends with theoretical principles. Craft begins with a purpose in continuous interaction with an external environment. This purpose may not survive this interaction and may be redefined in the process. Theoretical principles are simply a by-product that craftsmen stumble upon in the process of crafting. Theoretical principles are always provisional, waiting to be redefined instead of being a guide for legitimating action (Nelson & Stolterman, 2012: 173; Simon, 1996). Therefore, the craftsman does not have to be faithful to these principles in comparison to scholars and students of CSS beginning and ending with them. Michel Foucault (1984) reinforced this interpretation by understanding *techne* as a completely different way of producing knowledge and not simply applied scientific knowledge. Foucault understood *techne* as ‘practical rationality governed by a conscious goal’, thus changing how knowledge is used, produced and validated (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 111). Products, whether ideas or artefacts, are validated based on what they do to security realities, that is, based on their effects in getting closer to a conscious goal. Instead, the craftsman, in order to be successful, must be faithful to the external environment he seeks to shape bounded by limitations made evident in the process of crafting. In other words, crafting is in harmony with action as it does not wait for a good theory to act. The good theory is brought to consciousness in the process of crafting. Craft must begin with a conscious intent rather than with principles. This conscious intent remains the criteria of validity to assess products resulting from crafting. And, this intent may change in the process.

For security practitioners, beginning with a conscious intent may seem evident. However, contemporary security realities may blur this impression. On the one hand, the scientific way of warfare may lead to begin with certainties in the form of principles of war and models instead of beginning and ending with a conscious goal which tends to be forgotten in the process. On the other hand, several senior security practitioners interviewed mentioned that receiving unclear intents seem to become more often the norm than the exception perhaps as a reflection of the complexity of contemporary conflicts in the 21st century. Nonetheless, design thinking allows to bring to consciousness potential goals in harmony with the institutional, domestic and

international environments. Likewise, a craft inclined CSS would have to invest efforts in bringing to consciousness goals that may be implicit within this scholarly community instead of relying on theory to generate them. A craft attitude allows to generate a conscious goal providing a direction leaving aside principles that may or may not be reconfirmed in the process.

Abduction > Induction > Deduction

The conscious intent based on a desire to change conditions is the point of departure from a craft perspective. Abduction allows to identify what is needed? as well as how should this need be brought about? (Dorst, 2015: 50). These must be discovered in the process of crafting by leveraging creativity and feedback loops (see below). Abduction involves continuous guesswork to make something in harmony with current and emerging external conditions. This guesswork is not only fundamental for bringing the craft into being, but to make it innovative and relevant to a specific context until the craftsman judges that further guesswork would only bring negligible added value. A good craft expresses the specificities of a present time and space, or better, of emerging times and spaces by probing the unknown; that is, by asking what could be true and by testing it in contrast to *episteme* and to a lesser extent, to *phronesis* (Martin, 2009; Peirce et al., 1992). Prototyping an idea or an artefact is an example of abduction as it assumes a provisional state enabling learning to reach a subsequent provisional state by trial and errors. Security practitioners rely especially on abduction when they must develop operations without precedents. They must learn and improve their operational concept based on feedback loops and sometimes from trial and errors. In comparison, deductive reasoning draws inferences by applying a general rule already known to particular instances. Inductive reasoning draws inferences in the opposite direction, by observing patterns across particular cases to generate a rule out of them. Craft cannot rely on deductive reasoning as it does not begin nor end with principles as mentioned above. Craft cannot rely on inductive reasoning to generate novelty as induction is based on past experiences, not potential ones in more or less distant futures. In other words, abduction is the core feature distinguishing a craft attitude from a scientific and practical attitude, and one of the key notions making a difference in military planning.

American Pragmatist Philosopher Charles S. Peirce (1978; 1992) is known as the modern developer of abductive reasoning which bears different names in his writings such as

‘hypothesis’, then ‘abduction’, and later, ‘retroduction’. Peirce found traces of this reasoning in Aristotle’s *Analytics* in the form of “apagoge” but concluded that western knowledge production systems tended either to misunderstand or to suppress this third form of reasoning for the lack of certainty it could provide. Peirce’s textual production as well as his life reveal traces of this reasoning. Peirce never left definitive works that would summarize his contribution to philosophy. Instead, he left numerous essays, scattered in, more or less circulated, journals such as the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. From one essay to the next, sharp observers may detect similar ideas, each further improved upon. Peirce never waited for an impression of certainty provided by deductive reasoning or partial certainty provided by inductive reasoning to publish. Often trading clarity for cryptic writings, Peirce would let the best possible inference drive him. In so doing, he traded declarative logic, that is, proving a conclusion which is the very logic at the core of Western knowledge production, for modal logic, that is, supposing that a statement is provisionally true until proven otherwise.

Beyond prizing trial and errors, abductive reasoning opens new possibilities by giving credibility to intuitions connected to our inner being according to Peirce (1992: 170):

“The act of observation is the deliberate yielding of ourselves to that *force majeure*, an early surrender at discretion, due to our foreseeing that we must, whatever we do be borne down by that power, at last. Now the surrender which we make in Retroduction, is a surrender to the Insistence of an Idea. The hypothesis, as the Frenchman says, *c’est plus fort que moi*. It is irresistible; it is imperative. We must throw open our gates and admit it at any rate for the time being.”

What Peirce describes is the emotion involved in stumbling upon something new that was unthinkable before, a phenomenon most commonly known as a ‘aha’ or eureka moment. This emotion comes with a willingness to bring this new object into being despite challenging what the individual and its community may take for granted. In short, producing certainties and clarity, the vocation of science according to Max Weber (2004), is not all there is according to Peirce. Without giving a chance to guess, without taking leap of faiths from time to time, there would simply be no ways to break and move beyond conventions, including preferred ones in a community.

Both *episteme* and *phronesis* neglect ignore and sometimes fear abductive reasoning, preferring a greater impression of certainty provided first and foremost by deductive reasoning

and inductive reasoning, to a lesser extent. Yet, neither deductive reasoning nor inductive reasoning may provide the inferences required for generating innovations that may change the course of history (Peirce et al., 1992). While adaptation enables to catch up to the norm by building on inductive reasoning or deductive reasoning, innovation enables to develop game-changing outcomes that can only be brought about with abductive reasoning. Both deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning reflect past, and at best, present external conditions as their processes put the emphasis on ‘what was?’ or ‘what is?’ rather than ‘what could be?’. While *techne* ranks abduction above induction and then, deduction, *episteme*, on which CSS is grounded, reverses this order. Deductive reasoning seems more robust by starting with principles. However, inferences generated with deductive reasoning become less reflective of an emerging time and space. Likewise, *phronesis* prioritizes induction by developing tacit knowledge expressed in habits out of which judgment and wisdom are hammered out.

From the perspective of security practitioners, abduction is particularly useful to move out of deadlocks in order to develop novel understanding of a security reality and approaches to intervene in them that were both unthinkable before. For CSS, embracing abduction would mean giving more importance to speculative thought including imagining plausible futures, if not utopias and prototyping how to get closer to them.

Radical Particularism

Abduction is in harmony with particularism as it does not have the ambition of generating general rules. *Techne* and *Phronesis* are concerned with objects and subjects that can be otherwise, that is, with particular instances as Aristotle (2014: 101) observed. Not a single craft is the same. Every craft is tailor-made for a specific time and space, and every craft is an artefact expressing a specific time and space. While some interpreters see Aristotle as preferring *episteme* due to its focus on timeless and universal knowledge for contemplative purposes, Flyvbjerg (2001: 111) stresses that Aristotle believed more in the power of the particular and the contingent, especially for developing a well-functioning society. Flyvbjerg refers to Aristotle’s ‘power of example’ to bring to consciousness a more complex, ambiguous and contradictory reality than what a scientific attitude would normally tolerate. This focus on particular instances and a scepticism for universalism even led Aristotle to concede that, in some cases, crafting may

lead to develop better theories than philosophers. Hammering different objects every day, craftsmen would be less prone to generate abstract principles out of too few observations. They would be in a better position to categorize what can be otherwise and what cannot. In other words, which aspects of reality can be changed in a specific context, and which aspects cannot, including security realities.

Shaping particular material objects, up to external environments, into something that was unimaginable before assumes that agency can shape structures, including the most oppressive ones. A craft attitude allows to re-appropriate control – or at least an impression of control — over predetermined fate in particular instances, an assumption consistent with early CSS writings (Papanek, 1985). While security practitioners interviewed become aware of the specificities of the space they are engaged in, their system of knowledge production is anchored in a scientific attitude building on models, principles and formulas in order to provide an impression of certainty. Design thinking led some of them to realise that they were taking their models for the reality. Instead, employing design thinking encouraged them to craft tailor-made concepts to better intervene in security realities. As for CSS, this community excelled in developing case studies disrupting what would be seen as invariable accounts of the order of things by presenting at least another side of the story. This practice is nonetheless anchored in a robust scientific attitude and for the purpose of denunciatory critique. A craft inclined CSS would continue in leveraging particularism in case studies to challenge the order of things but would also craft tailor-made alternative pathways to specific circumstances. These alternative pathways could not be reproduced in another time and space.

Feedback Loops Towards Excellence

As craft generates a provisional and a particular object thanks to abduction, self-corrective feedback loops remain central to continuously validate and improve this object towards excellence. No matter the discipline, no matter the profession, Richard Sennett (2008: 9) concurs that what drives craft is a desire to ‘do a job well for its own sake’, that is, a desire for excellence. This implies that crafts are never definitive, but always coming to be until the craftsman decides that further improvements would be of negligible added value or lead to obsession. The craftsman can never achieve excellence, but always aspires towards it. Feedback

loops — connected to both objects and subjects — is the main engine to perpetually improve towards excellence. As for material feedback loops, the logic of craft is rarely entirely abstract such as is often the case in a scientific attitude. Craft is always in relationship with a certain form of materiality, either directly by aiming to turn a material object into something else or indirectly, by acting through a form of representation (a text, a drawing or a model for instance) (Lawson, 2006). Material feedback is involved across most human activities. For instance, the sculptor continuously adjusts hand pressure to the clay as it reacts as the CSS scholar adjusts his writing to the blank screen being filled and as the military designer adjusts his visualization to inscriptions filling the board. The material responds to the craftsman. The material provides feedback and opportunities for new forms to take shape as well as providing information on their limits.

As for intersubjective feedback loops, the logic of craft echoes the pragmatic principle of fallibilism also developed by Peirce (Bernstein, 2013). Accordingly, every craft should always be provisional, waiting to be ‘challenged, revised, corrected and even rejected’ by both the self and others. Knowledge, taken as a craft, can always be perfectible in contrast to looking for fixed principles in a scientific attitude. For Bernstein, current knowledge will be eventually taken as ‘false’, as a craft will eventually be forgotten and replaced by a new one in harmony with an emerging time and space. Beyond material in itself, the community becomes the only arbiter of a valid craft: ‘It is only in and through subjecting our prejudices, hypotheses, and guesses to public criticism by a relevant community of inquirers that we can hope to escape from our limited perspectives, test our beliefs, and bring about the growth of knowledge’ (Bernstein, 2013). In short, versions of a craft are often reached after several failures improved by feedback loops and sometimes, out of sheer luck as Aristotle (2014: 102) observed. The danger of relying on feedback loops for validation remains in an obsession with details (Sennett, 2008).

Normativity involved in changing specific aspects of reality into something else remains to be defined by the craftsman. Indeed, individuals can rely on a craft attitude to bring about a more oppressive, as much as a more emancipated, reality for the human condition, and this, even with materials seen as non-oppressive such as philosophies underlying CSS for instance. As Sennett concedes, ‘Craftsmanship is certainly, from an ethical point of view, ambiguous. Robert

Oppenheimer was a committed craftsman; he pushed his technical skills to the limit to make the best bomb he could.’ Likewise, Flyvbjerg (2001: 62) considers the same promises and dangers in a potential craft inclined social sciences:

“Social science can also contribute to social development as *techne* in grappling with social, cultural, demographic, and administrative problems. Here the social sciences can play an emancipatory role; or they may act as controlling, repressive, and legitimating. [...] In any event, this role of social science will be linked to real problems with a material foundation that one can fight for or against, a far cry from the fictive role of social science as epistemic science.”

Yet, the logic of craft implies normative principles valorizing continuous curiosity and a desire for excellence. But most importantly, craftsmanship is reflexive as it involves not only asking ‘how should we make X different and/or better’ but ‘why should we do so?’ Curiosity is therefore directed not only outward but also inward to get ever closer to excellence. And, excellence typically implies using minimal effort to fulfill a conscious intent.

Security professionalism is already rooted in an ethic of excellence. However, more and more security practitioners rely on a craft attitude to leverage failures instead of condemning them. Outcomes perceived as failures or away from excellence are a means to learn about the self and an external environment in order to become relevant. Likewise, CSS scholars are already used to feedback loops with regard to crafting sophisticated texts. A craft inclined CSS would transfer this practice to communities to engage while taking part in a process aiming at changing security realities.

Phronesis

Design thinking applied in civilian activities such as architecture, management or engineering compensates for the ambiguous and minimalistic normativity implied in craft with *Phronesis*, the third virtues of thought according to Aristotle after *Episteme* and *Techne*. Practice, in this sense, involves deducing and inducing context-dependent knowledge to act wisely and prudently based on experiences (Brown, 2012). Aristotle, therefore, put more emphasis on intellectual judgment in the sense of ethics acquired in the midst of experience to define practice. Military design thinking, as practiced so far in Western Armed Forces, focused mostly on *Techne* in order to balance *Episteme*. Nonetheless, a likely evolution — as the military design movement

becomes more mainstream — will be to complete the balancing act with *Phronesis* as well in the form of design ethics.

According to Flyvbjerg, social sciences including CSS, must trade *episteme* for *phronesis* in order to be relevant again. This would enable to develop the judgment required to answer three value-rational questions:

- (1) Where are we going?
- (2) Is this desirable?
- (3) What should be done?

Phronesis alone, however, is ill-equipped to answer these questions as it requires *Techne* to imagine alternative pathways to transform security realities beyond only grounding judgment on past experiences. *Phronesis* operates well in the status quo as a good lawyer applying the rule of law without necessarily changing the system. However, it requires *techne* to bring about and continuously improve new security realities. Flyvberg's interpretation of *techne* in the modern sense of techniques instead of artistry leveraged to produce something new to fulfill a conscious goal prevented him from considering the possibility of social sciences anchored in both *techne*, for its creative and transformational potential and *phronesis*, for its normative potential.

In sum, a craft attitude distinguishes itself from a scientific and practical attitude by being directed by a conscious intent, by generating novel inferences first and foremost with abduction, by showing a great care for particularism in contrast to fixed principles, and by leveraging feedback loops for continuous validity and improvements. In contrast to *episteme* and *phronesis*, *techne* has rarely, if ever, been institutionalized in security professions as in critical scholarly disciplines up to Israel's attempts between 1995-2005, US armed forces' attempts from 2005 onwards and Canadian Armed Forces' attempts from 2013 onwards to name a few.⁸ Of all instances, taking a closer look at the Disengagement of Gaza led by Brigadier General (BGen.) Gershon Hacoen will allow to provide a more concrete understanding of how a craft attitude enabled to turn critique into action contributing to a positive normative outcome according to the international community.

⁸ Some security practitioners embraced a craft attitude before such as T.E. Lawrence, Orde Wingate or Jon Boyd. However, craft was more an individual initiative than an attitude encouraged by the organization (Graicer, 2015). The closest parallel remains the institutionalization of Operational Art in the 1980s.

Crafting Spaces in the Disengagement of Gaza in 2005

Leveraging craft to tackle challenges in architecture, management and public policy is well documented around the world, especially in the form of design thinking (Dorst, 2015). Unfortunately, security practices leveraging on a craft attitude are quite the contrary. Processes employed by formal design team as well as their outputs are more often than not classified. Informal craft in the form of ‘muddling through’ is the default logic when *episteme* shows signs of irrelevance and when *phronesis* reaches its limits. Yet, these informal cases are rarely documented. Most instances take place informally. As Canadian BGen. Jennie Carignan (2018) offered as an advice to an audience mostly composed of officers in January 2018: ‘Don’t wait for direction to do design. Just do it’. Formally or informally, security practitioners usually leverage a craft attitude to address parts of larger endeavours, be it to address strategic, operational or institutional challenges. The researcher interested in presenting a comprehensive and concrete instance of craft as the action unfolds is limited by these obstacles.

Despite this, the IDF provide two instances that are largely documented: the first being Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank in 2002 and the second being the Disengagement of Gaza in 2005 (Weizman, 2007). The latter is ideal since BGen. Gershon Hacoheh relied on a craft attitude to think, plan and operate, the BBC recorded the events as they unfolded including negotiations with settlers, and this instance is largely seen as normatively positive by the international community, allowing to focus on the craft attitude leveraged to build on critical philosophies to change security realities. After presenting the context behind the disengagement, this section explores how Hacoheh’s approach expressed the four principles of a craft attitude: conscious intent, abductive reasoning, particularism and self-correction.

Context

Several analysts considered the disengagement as one of the most complex undertakings in IDF history based on its implications across multiple dimensions including security, legal, moral, economic, political, and religious (Catignani, 2008). For many Israelis, this operation involved trading Zionism’s Greater Israel narrative for preserving both Israel’s Jewish and democratic identities (Rynhold & Waxman, 2008). While surveys showed a majority of Israelis

in favour, a profound opposition could be found within all sectors of society such as in religious organisations, in all political parties, and in security organizations (Catignani, 2008: 174). Both Ariel Sharon, the prime minister at the time, and 40 % of Israeli population surveyed feared that this operation could end up in a civil war (Rynhold & Waxman, 2008: 31). Sharon (2005) recognized these tensions and called for unity in a televised address before the disengagement: “The disagreement over the Disengagement Plan has caused severe wounds, bitter hatred between brothers and severe statements and actions. I understand the feelings, the pain and the cries of those who object. However, we are one nation even when fighting and arguing.”

In late 2004, the peace process between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Government reached a deadlock. The former accused Israel of pursuing colonization of Palestinian territories and the latter accused Palestinians of pursuing violence in the form of terrorism, both contravening the roadmap for peace agreed more than one year before. Pressures from the United States in addition to fears of losing the peace initiative to Saudi Arabia and Switzerland incited Sharon to call for a unilateral disengagement of Gaza. Occupied since the Six-Day War of 1967, this initiative involved evacuating 8 000 Jewish settlers in the 21 settlements of Gaza and 4 isolated settlements in the West Bank (Rynhold & Waxman, 2008: 31). Most of these settlers perceived the disengagement as a betrayal of the State of Israel represented in the figure of Sharon, previously acclaimed as a champion of settlers. Several organisations launched smear campaigns to portray Sharon as a traitor, notably in rallies and on road signs (Berlin, 2011). Despite opposition, both demographic and economic based narratives provided a rationale for this decision across Israeli society. As demographics called into question the capability of Israel to remain a democratic Jewish state in the long term, withdrawing from Gaza would allow it to buy time. From a demographic perspective, this meant removing 1 375 000 Palestinians from the overall Israeli population (Rynhold & Waxman, 2008: 23). Pursuing the occupation also involved excessive military costs for ensuring the security of 8 000 settlers. For the same reason, some understood the disengagement of Gaza as a test for prospective disengagement of parts of the West Bank. Indeed, several religious groups could not envision no longer holding territories covering the Ancient Kingdom of David. Some religious leaders even called for civil disobedience, and others even interpreted this event as announcing the destruction of Israel. Others including Benjamin Netanyahu, the current prime minister, opposed the

unilateral aspect of the disengagement. They saw in it a direct withdrawal with nothing in return and the potential danger that Hamas could frame this outcome as victory resulting from using violence. The mean was also questioned. Personnel deployed shared the belief of the IDF as a people's army. Relying on the IDF to conduct the disengagement risked disrupting this narrative by opposing the people's army to the very people it sought to protect, thus potentially undermining the legitimacy of the organization as a force of national unity.

The IDF enjoyed a global reputation of excellence for reaching desired results at the tactical level, that is, at the level of direct interaction with rivals on the ground. As the Disengagement of Gaza involved the very identity of Israel, tactical excellence grounded on a scientific attitude would not be enough to reach desired political outcomes according to the IDF general staff. Prior to this realization, security practitioners proved more likely to embrace a scientific attitude in the form of principles of war from the 17th century onwards. As Antoine Bousquet (2009) observes, the development of modern technologies — such as the clock, the steam engine and computer to name a few — combined with rationalism provided the ground for a scientific way of warfare. The objective was to rely on science to produce as many certainties as possible about war. Otherwise, the stakes including survival would be too high for actors to plunge into such an uncertain phenomenon. After all, the very concept of war implies that war betrays its own concept (Jullien, 2004). War, and those successful in this endeavour, disrupt the dominant understanding of this phenomena. The prestige of science allowed to give an impression of control over the contingencies of war and to produce linear plans to specific outcomes. War, however, tended to resist scientific theories deployed to uncover its principles, from the most general to the most particular. Despite this, security institutions feared a craft attitude and preferred the impression of control provided by a scientific attitude. A scientific attitude seemed effective as long as the certainties they provided seem credible. Yet, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, followed by the Lebanon War from 1982 to 1985 and, then, to the First Intifada from 1987 to 1993 shattered these certainties and with it, a scientific attitude to warfare in Israel (Lanir, 2010; Lanir & Sneh, 2000; Naveh, 2007: 77)(Interview, 2015b). For instance, Moshe Ya'alon reached this conclusion as an IDF division commander during the first intifada in 1992:

“I felt that we were missing tools; I felt that the discourses in Central Command as well as in other places were not deep enough. They dealt with foam on water. . . I felt

it was wrong. . . as I began my duty as the Central Command Commander I understood that we had to build a different process. . .” (Michael, 2007: 431).

This conclusion would become consensual as most security practitioners came to consider their rationalist planning methodologies as inadequate for the intricacies of contemporary conflicts.

This conclusion lay the ground for founding the Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI) led by BGen. (ret.) Shimon Naveh, BGen. (ret.) Dovik Tamari and Dr. Zvi Lanir.⁹ The objective was to develop methodologies for better aligning political goals with actions on the ground and teach them to senior officers via the Advanced Operational Command and Staff Course (AOCSC).¹⁰ OTRI named its methodology systemic operational design (SOD) at the time. Nowadays, this methodology evolved in several versions, each with a different name such as the US Army Design Methodology (ADM) released in 2015. Leveraging poststructuralist philosophies grounded in a craft attitude was a core element of the AOCSC. Precisely, four themes composed the curriculum: early soviet operational art (e.g. Tukhachevsky, Isserson, Varfolomeev), epistemology (e.g. Kuhn, Cohen, Wilkins), systems theory (e.g. Capra, Maturana), and poststructuralism (Virilio, Deleuze and Guattari, Tschumi) (Adamsky, 2010: 101). The poststructuralist tradition proved particularly helpful to deconstruct conceptual foundations preventing individuals and organizations from remaining relevant in changing realities according to Naveh and his colleagues (Interview, 2015a).¹¹ By definition, poststructuralist authors reject conceptual foundations. As Lanir (2000) put it: “Only within postmodern relativist discourse was a cognitive space created, enabling us to justify philosophically and ideally *subjective knowledge-in-context* and to legitimize our quest for it.” CSS also rely on poststructuralism to bring awareness to conventions solidifying several forms of domination. As Lanir, they all saw in poststructuralism a means to disrupt orders of thought in the aim of intellectual emancipation, if not more holistic forms of emancipation.

⁹ Lieutenant General Amnon Schachak, the chief of staff, and his deputy Major General Matan Vil'nai passed a resolution to launch both OTRI and the first AOCSC course in 1995 (Naveh, 2007: 97).

¹⁰ The AOCSC was taught to 12 to 15 colonels and first star general officers (brigadier-general) per course between 1995 and 2003. Commanding officers of all corps (air forces, navy, military intelligence, special forces, army) selected students to attend the course. This selection was often totally informal.

¹¹ A vast collection of poststructuralist authors made concepts available to be used for this purpose. Lanir, for instance, refers to Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of binary opposites in Western logic. Naveh preferred Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's nomadic war machine perpetually disrupting any convention as they formalize, for this purpose (Interview, 2015a). And, Ben Zweibelson (2017), Jean Baudrillard's simulacra and Jacques Rancière's ignorant schoolmaster (Interview, 2016a).

While poststructuralism provided the perfect tools for moving out of aging and distant orders of thought, it proved ill-equipped for following and perhaps even anticipating emerging contexts. CSS could remain at the deconstruction stage as long as it could find new orders of thought or objects to disrupt. In so doing, CSS scholars preserved theoretical consistency by ever postponing difficult attempts at changing the world. Security practitioners did not have this choice. They had to prioritize action perhaps to the risk of undermining theoretical consistency. They did so by continuously oscillating between deconstruction and reconstruction or in other words, by recrafting their conventions before taking part in recrafting security realities. Most did so by building on a craft attitude as developed above, mostly anchored in design and system thinking. Attending the AOCSC provided the knowledge base for Hacoheh to think, plan and conduct the Disengagement of Gaza in a novel way. He relied in part on Soviet informed operational art and on poststructuralism to deconstruct and reconstruct spaces in order to minimize violence during the operation (Hacoheh & Hazani, 2010).

Hacoheh's Management of a Clash of Conscious Intentions

Prime Minister Sharon's official intent behind the disengagement was to take a unilateral initiative to break out of a deadlock in the Road Map towards peace with the Palestinians in order to enhance Israel's 'security, political, economic and demographic situation' (Prime Minister Office, 2004). According to Sharon, this decision reflected the changing reality of the country and its regional environment. While this goal was clear, it remains controversial to this day. Therefore, the challenge for Hacoheh was not in crafting the security reality of the disengagement according to this goal, but to manage a clash between the conscious intent of the political echelon and the conscious intent of his troops. Private and professional vocations collided. Not only did the 18 000 police officers and 41 000 IDF soldiers deployed would have to manage this clash within themselves, but also Hacoheh (Berlin, 2011: 174). Despite educating personnel several months in advance to deal with this clash of vocations, some units refused to take part under conscientious objection grounds. The IDF general staff began fearing massive refusals on the same grounds to the point of understanding this possibility as an existential threat to the cohesion of both IDF and Israel (Catignani, 2008: 174). Thousands of personnel deployed were settlers themselves, had settler relatives or risked their lives protecting and building

settlements before. Hacoheh faced this clash of vocation both inward and outward. He grew up in a Zionist family supporting the Greater Israel narrative in a West Bank Settlement. Several of his siblings became rabbis, all opposed to the disengagement on ideological grounds. Hacoheh received this assignment by coincidence. He was simply not in the right place at the right time.

Hacoheh resolved this clash of vocations inward and outward by taking a craft attitude. He leveraged the tensions between his professional vocation and his private vocation as with the personnel under his command instead of trying to reconcile opposites. While prioritizing the professional vocation following the official intent of the Israeli government, Hacoheh found an unprecedented opportunity in his private vocation shared with several personnel under his command. Their private vocation put them in an ideal position to empathize with the settlers, the ‘others’ targeted by the operation. These ‘others’ were, after all, already part of the self. In an interview a few years later, Hacoheh (2010) was still against this disengagement, but he believed that the outcomes would have been worse if a more enthusiastic commander would have been in charge. Paradoxically, preserving vocations in opposite in his way of thinking allowed reaching the conscious goal more smoothly and by minimising violence. Hacoheh also expressed a craft attitude by founding his actions on a conscious goal that he understood holistically beyond his personal judgment. He was fully aware that actions taken on the ground could hinder higher strategic goals such as national unity.

Hacoheh's Abductive > Inductive > Deductive Reasoning

While the goal was clear in the disengagement of Gaza, what was needed to reach it and how to reach it, was not evident. Hacoheh (2010) had no other choice than attempting abductive reasoning to construct his strategic narrative as he was in the unknown. The disengagement was a unique event without a precedent, nor lessons to build on. Accordingly, Hacoheh understood that using fixed principles and constructs for planning the operation, while providing an impression of certainty, would potentially lead to failure. Without knowing whether his attempt would be successful or not in advance, Hacoheh crafted a strategic narrative reconstructing spaces, both figuratively and literally echoing Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari's (1980) deterritorialization and reterritorialization. In meetings with settlers, Hacoheh deconstructed Gaza into two spaces: Gaza up in the sky, that is, Gaza in the spiritual Zionist space and Gaza

down, that is, Gaza in the physical space. This, Hacoen thought, would prevent security personnel and settlers from turning into exclusive others. In this narrative, both security personnel and settlers were united in sharing the same attachment to Gaza in the spiritual Zionist space. This shared cultural space gave credibility to the deep respect security personnel held for the ideas making settlers hold territories at all costs. Building on poststructuralism and Soviet Operational Art, Hacoen (2010)'s narrative stressed that Israelis did not have to physically hold Gaza to preserve a spiritual connection with this space despite the lack of physical continuity inside the borders of Israel. Conversely, while security personnel would have to physically destroy settlements against their will, this act would leave the spiritual space undamaged.

[Insert Figure 3]

Hacoen relied on visualization to craft the operation tentatively, from one iteration to the next, by giving importance to a symbolism consistent with his narrative (see above). He consciously disposed artefacts in this physical space to give credence to this narrative in a timely manner. The operation involved disposing barriers in advance as shown in Hacoen's visualization above. As the main barrier would imply upcoming expulsion, Hacoen put special care in always having senior officers at the barrier. This positioning sought to transform the barrier from a symbol of direct opposition to a symbol of mediation. Hacoen also authorized a protest tent by the barrier to symbolize tensions allowed, but also limited to a specific space. Settlers barricaded in a synagogue nonetheless resisted this narrative until the end. Hacoen ordered playing religious music from outdoor speakers to craft the atmosphere to compensate for a lack of communicative channels. In other words, abductive reasoning allowed to accept there was not a ready-made narrative and material disposition for this operation. A tailor-made narrative had to be crafted and tried without any certainty whether it would prove successful or not. In contrast, deductive reasoning would have led to apply doctrinal principles not conceived for removing settlers from an area. Likewise, inductive reasoning would have led to seek to find a precedent to build on, although none replicated the same circumstances in the Israeli context. Precedents may also have legitimated a more forceful approach.

Haochen's Radical Particularism

Hacohen's (2010) particularism is aligned with abductive reasoning above. Hacohen's particularism was radical to the point of refusing to provide advice to commanders deployed to specific sites. Instead, he preferred relying on a generative approach to let local commanders develop knowledge about the environment during the operation. For example, personnel had more preparation resources for dealing with themselves and managing potential crises with subordinates than about the settlers, that are, those they were tasked to evacuate. As Hacohen put it, he could not give a better solution than the one attempted by those in these micro contexts. David Berlin (2011: 215), a journalist witnessing the event unfolds, recall that commanders had little specific information on the mission on purpose: 'As [Hacohen] sees things, rigid descriptions of the enemy, briefs delivered in army jargon, timetables, fixed battlegrounds and theatres are things of the past.' Instead, commanders had to develop their own understanding of who they were opposing in time and space. This move prevented commanders from employing ready-made representations and strategies developed in a different time and space. This unprecedented flexibility contributed in minimizing the potential for violence by trying to force a model onto the operation. Hacohen's radical particularism reflects a craft attitude as it preserves a blank slate to better observe the variable and context-dependent nature of objects and subjects in an environment. In other words, the operation is being crafted continuously, in real time, in order to reflect the particularities of each evolving micro and macro contexts.

Hacohen's Feedback Loops Towards Excellence

Hacohen's success was also based on continuous self-correction thanks to a responsiveness to feedback from settlers and staff. For instance, if some settlers raised a parallel between police uniforms and Nazi uniforms, Hacohen simply ordered a change of uniform in an exchange of goodwill from settlers (Garnsey, 2005). In exchange, settlers opened the gate to police officers to the compound. Likewise, when rabbis denounced a too small a proportion of women personnel, Hacohen simply called the Headquarters to mobilize more reservist women instead of showing inflexibility (Berlin, 2011). In other words, he showed flexibility in channelling his efforts towards the goal despite pressures from Major General Dan Harel, his superior, advocating for a more offensive approach without compromises (Garnsey, 2005).

To reach the most relevant understandings and strategies, Hacoheh relied on direct discourse, that is, a discursive clash of positions originating in the Talmudic tradition and similar to Habermas's ideal speech (Interview, 2015). Hacoheh ordered personnel to use it between officers and subordinates and between personnel and settlers. The IDF Education Branch shared 4 000 utile forms kits including a framework for discourse between officers and soldiers focused on controversial orders involving clash of vocations (Catignani, 2008: 175). As for engaging settlers, Hacoheh (2010) ordered military and police personnel to conduct meetings in each house including some of which he personally participated in. During these meetings, he insisted to pay particular attention to the spatial positioning of personnel and settlers. In other words, continuous feedback loops through discourse enabled them to refine the operation in the making as a craft to be ever perfected.

Overall, Hacoheh did not applied theory, here poststructuralism and soviet operational art, into practice in a scientific attitude. Therefore, he did not have to build on the theory with the same rigour. Yet, finding inspiration in poststructuralism in a craft attitude proved more effective than in a scientific attitude for changing the human condition and in ultimately minimizing violence to the surprise of most. As a result, only 320 security practitioners were treated for minor injuries out of 59 000 and 600 protestors were arrested (Catignani, 2008).

Conclusion

Where is CSS going? Is it desirable? And, what should be done? Flyvbjerg's questions are relevant for the future of CSS again at a crossroads between its ambitions to show how reality could be 'otherwise' and making this 'otherwise', a reality. Both directions nonetheless present an opportunity for the future: they are both anchored into the variable, into what can be changed. They both point towards moving away from a scientific attitude (*Episteme*) concerned with the invariable rewarded in the academic institution. They both point towards two alternative attitudes identified by Aristotle: *Phronesis* and *Techne*, practice and craft. In other words, this article argued that CSS would prove better at intervening in security realities by balancing its virtues of thought, and especially towards a craft attitude in two complementary ways. The first way was by presenting four principles reflecting a craft attitude and what might a craft inclined CSS look like accordingly: producing knowledge with a conscious intent, abductively, focused

on particular instances and in a self-corrective fashion. The second way was by presenting a concrete example where security practitioners leveraged a craft attitude to build on poststructuralism to change security realities leading to better normative outcomes during the disengagement of Gaza according to the international community. All in all, this outline suggests craft as a third way for CSS to move out of understanding CSS as producing theory informed knowledge in the form of denunciatory critique in sophisticated texts or applied mostly from the perspective of a scientific attitude.

Senior officers attending the National Security Programme at Canadian Forces College experiment with a craft attitude by revisiting the disengagement of Gaza in a day design thinking tutorial since 2017. This tutorial became one of the most successful at the college. Candice Luck, a facilitator in human-centric design, implicitly recommend a craft attitude from the first moments: ‘There are no perfect design models, take what’s useful for you and make it your own.’¹² Filling the shoes of BGen. Hacoheh, each team needed to provide a strategy. Of six approaches generated in total over 2017 and 2018, only one recommended using violence although the actual operation did not rely on the use of violence. This is a reminder that while promising, craft remains normatively ambiguous and potentially dangerous in comparison to simply following principles provided by a scientific attitude or ethics, generated in following a practical attitude. Actors may choose to (re)craft anything, including core values but in a conscious manner. This is another reason to take a closer look at how security practitioners move further towards a craft attitude in comparison to other fields of activities also taking this turn such as social innovation, management and architecture. This should not push back students and scholars of CSS towards experimenting with a craft attitude. On the contrary, CSS should not remain distant from the drawing board, but become a full-fledged agent ensuring that its normative commitment transcends security realities in the making. A craft inclined CSS can take several forms such as research action, co-education with security practitioners, or becoming design facilitators. Most military students experimenting with design thinking recognize that the potential of their craft is limited by a lack of diversity of thoughts that could be compensated with greater involvement of civilians, including CSS students. A craft attitude allows to open

¹² Candice Luck, 2018, *Design Tutorial*, National Security Programme 10, Canadian Forces College, February 25th.

new possibilities unthinkable for human beings that may emancipate them from oppressive structures. A craft inclined CSS might contribute in making the craft more ethical and sustainable.

This outline hopes to initiate a conversation for alternative means to produce knowledge in CSS. As such, further research is required in both the philosophy behind craft as well as researching more instances of craft in the field of security to reveal patterns that may be compatible to a potential direction CSS may wish to take. On theory, further research needs to investigate the assumptions behind craftsmanship and artistry and how it may relate to knowledge production in the field of security. As humanity seems to consolidate a division of labour rewarding episteme over craft, a counter-movement is already prolific in theorizing craft in philosophy, history and sociology. On instances of craft, a CSS curious in craft could enquire several actors involved in security relying on a craft attitude such as development agencies, and non-governmental agencies even subalterns, who may have more normative affinities. CSS would also benefit from engaging several fields already involved in intervening in security realities such as design thinking, system thinking and social innovation.

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